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In a buyer–supplier game, a special type of assignment game, a distinguished player,
called the buyer, wishes to purchase some combinatorial structure. A set of players,
called suppliers, offer various components of the structure for sale. Any combinatorial
minimization problem can be transformed into a buyer–supplier game. While most
previous work has been concerned with characterizing the core of buyer–supplier games,
in this paper we study optimization over the set of core vectors. We give a polynomial
time algorithm for optimizing over the core of any buyer–supplier game for which the
underlyingminimization problem is solvable in polynomial time. In addition, we show that
it is hard to determine whether a given vector belongs to the core if the base minimization
problem is not solvable in polynomial time. Finally, we introduce and study the concept of
focus point price, which answers the question: If we are constrained to play in equilibrium,
how much can we lose by playing the wrong equilibrium?
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In this paper, we study the core of a large set of games, a subset of assignment games, which we term buyer–supplier
games [3,22], [23, Chapter 6]. We are primarily concerned with efficient computations over the set of vectors belonging to
the core of buyer–supplier games. Before diving into an overview of buyer–supplier games, we present some connections
between our work and the existing literature.
1.1. Related work
Though suggested by Edgeworth as early as 1881 [8], the notion of the corewas formalized by Gillies and Shapley [11,21],
extending von Neumann and Morgenstern’s work on coalitional game theory [24]. Recently, Goemans and Skutella studied
the core of a cost sharing facility location game [12]. In their paper, Goemans and Skutella are primarily interested in using
core vectors as a cost sharing indicator, to decide how much each customer should pay for opening the facility used by the
customer. Goemans and Skutella show that, in general, the core of the cost sharing facility location game they study is empty.
In contrast, for the buyer–supplier games we study, the core is always nonempty. Additionally, in our work we do not view
vectors in the core as an indication of cost shares but rather as rational outcomes of negotiation amongst the players in the
buyer–supplier game. Pál and Tardos extend the work of Goemans and Skutella by developing a mechanism for the cost
sharing facility location game which uses the concept of an approximate core [15].
There has been great interest in comparing the game’s best outcome to the best equilibrium outcome, where the term
‘best’ is based on some objective function. For example, one may wish to compare the outcome maximizing the net utility
for all players in the game against the best possible Nash equilibrium, with respect to net utility. Papadimitriou termed one
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such comparative measure as the price of anarchy [16]. Roughgarden and Tardos have studied the price of anarchy in the
context of routing [18–20].
In this paper, we introduce a quantity with a similar motivation to that of the price of anarchy. Solution concepts often
yieldmultiple predictions, or equilibria. In actual game play, however, only one of the equilibria can be chosen by the game’s
players. Experiments show that conditions outside the game, such as societal pressures or undue attention to a specific
player, focus the players’ attention on the point of a single equilibrium, which then becomes the outcome of the game. This
is a common notion in game theory, called the focus point. A player may receive different payoffs in different equilibria.
How much is the player willing to pay for a good focus point? We define the focus point pricewith respect to a given player
as the difference between the maximum and minimum equilibrium payoffs to the player. Stated succinctly, focus point
price answers the question: If we are constrained to play in equilibrium, how much can we lose by playing the wrong
equilibrium?
Recently, Garg et al. studied transferable utility games they call coalitional games on graphs [10]. Coalitional games on
graphs are a proper subset of buyer–supplier games, which can be derived by setting the buyer’s internal cost, Bcost, to zero
(see Section 1.3 and Lemma 11). For some buyer–supplier games, for example the buyer–supplier facility location game, it
does not appear that the game can be described with Bcost fixed to zero.
Garg et al. study the concepts of ‘‘frugality’’ and ‘‘agents are substitutes’’. They show that suppliers are substitutes if and
only if the core of the game forms a lattice. In buyer–supplier games, suppliers are not always substitutes. We show, in
Lemma 15, that if suppliers are substitutes, we can optimize over the core by solving a polynomially sized linear program.
Garg et al. and, more recently, Karlin et al. study and characterize the frugality certain auction mechanisms; the focus point
price concept introduced in this paper is quite different from frugality [13].
A third difference between Garg et al. and this work comes from the fact that, similarly to the economics literature, Garg
et al. are mainly concerned with the characterization of the core: When does the core form a lattice? How do core vectors
relate to auctions? We, on the other hand, are mainly concerned with characterizing optimization over the core. Our main
results are in the flavor of Deng and Papadimitriou, in that we are interested in the complexity of computing using game
theoretic characterizations [7].
Faigle and Kern study optimization over the core for submodular cost partition games [9]. Faigle and Kern exhibit a
generic greedy-type algorithm for optimization of any linear function over the core of partition games whose value function
is both submodular and weakly increasing, a property they define.
The greedy framework of Faigle and Kern captures certain buyer–supplier games, such as the buyer–supplier minimum
spanning tree game. However, even some buyer–supplier games derived fromproblems that admit greedy solutions, such as
the buyer–supplier shortest path game, are not amenable to the approach of Faigle and Kern. In this paper, we do not restrict
ourselves to greedy algorithms. By making use of the ellipsoid method, we are able to give polynomial time algorithms
for optimization over the core of any buyer–supplier game for which the underlying minimization problem is solvable in
polynomial time.
To provide the reader with a simple, concrete example of optimization over the core of a buyer–supplier game, towards
the end of this paper, we focus our attention on the buyer–supplier minimum spanning tree game. We give a simple greedy
algorithm for this problem,which is aminor extension of Kruskal’sminimum spanning tree algorithm. A greedy algorithm is
provided by thework of Faigle and Kern, but their exposition involves a good deal ofmachinery. Our exposition is completely
elementary.
Several methods, apart from buyer–supplier games, are known for transforming a combinatorial optimization problem
into a game. The cores of these transformations have also been extensively studied. For example, Deng et al. show results
on core non-emptyness, distinguishability of core vectors, and finding core vectors for one such transformation [6]. Caprara
et al. continue the work of Deng et al. by considering a certain optimization over the set of core vectors for this alternate
transformation [4].
1.2. Main contributions
There has been increased interest from the theoretical computer science community in game theory. While problem-
specific solutions may give us insight, to leverage the full power of decades of study in both research areas, we must find
generic computational solutions to game theoretic problems. Indeed, others have already realized this need [1,17]. In this
paper, we continue this line of work by deriving generic results for computing with core solutions in a large class of games.
The core of buyer–supplier games in the transferable utility setting is characterized by Shapley and Shubik [22]. As a
minor contribution, we extend their result by showing that the core in the non-transferable utility setting is the same as the
core with transferable utilities. Our primary contributions are as follows:
(1) While previous work in the economics literature has concentrated on characterizing the core of buyer–supplier games
and relating core vectors to auctions, our main interest is in optimizing over the set of core vectors [3]. We provide a
generally applicable algorithm, based on the ellipsoid method, for optimizing over the core. If the original minimization
problem is solvable in polynomial time, we show that it is possible to optimize linear functions of core vectors in
polynomial time.
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(2) We fully characterize optimization over the core of buyer–supplier games by using a polynomial time reduction to show
that if the original minimization problem is not solvable in polynomial time, it is impossible, in polynomial time, to test
if an arbitrary vector is in the core of the buyer–supplier game.
(3) We introduce the concept of focus point price. Our positive computational results give a polynomial time algorithm for
computing the buyer’s focus point price in buyer–supplier gameswhen the underlyingminimization problem is solvable
in polynomial time. When the underlying minimization problem is not solvable in polynomial time, we show that it is
impossible to approximate the buyer’s focus point price to within anymultiplicative factor.
1.3. Overview of buyer–supplier games
The definition of a buyer–supplier game, given in Section 2.1, is self-contained and does not require an argument.
However, it is also possible to transform a combinatorial minimization problem into a buyer–supplier game. Consider a
combinatorial minimization problem of the following form. We have some finite set of elements C. We designate some
subsets of C as feasible. To capture feasibility, we use a predicate P : 2C → {0, 1}, where the predicate is one on all feasible
subsets ofC. With each feasible setA ⊆ C, we associate a non-negative cost f (A). The combinatorialminimization problem
can then be captured by the function MinProb : 2C → ℜ+ defined by
MinProb(B) = min
A ⊆ B
P(A) = 1
f (A)
whereℜ+ denotes the non-negative real numbers.
To transform the above minimization problem into a buyer–supplier game, we associate a player with each element of
C; we call such players suppliers. We also add another player whom we call the buyer. In the game, the buyer wishes to
purchase a feasible subset of C. The suppliers, on the other hand, are offering their membership to the buyer’s set at a price.
To fully specify the game’s model of a realistic interaction, we let M designate the maximum investment the buyer is
willing to spend on a feasible set.Wedecompose f such that f (A) = Bcost(A)+∑a∈A τ(a), where τ(a) is an internal cost for
supplier a to be present in the buyer’s set and Bcost(A) is an internal cost to the buyer for purchasing this specific feasible set.
In general, many such decompositions are possible, and they produce different games. However, when specifically applying
the core solution concept, Lemma 11 shows that all such decompositions are equivalent. Though it is not necessary, to
remove special cases in our statements, it is convenient to let Bcost(A) = M whenA = ∅ orA is not feasible.
Now that we have determined the internal costs for the buyer and the suppliers, we can specify the game. The buyer–
supplier game is specified by the tuple (C, τ , Bcost). The strategy set for the buyer is the power set of C. By playingA ⊆ C,
the buyer chooses to purchase the membership of the suppliers inA. The strategy set for every supplier a ∈ C is the non-
negative real numbers, indicating a bid or payment required from the buyer for the supplier’s membership.
For any supplier a ∈ C, we let β(a) denote the associated bid. Let A be the set of suppliers chosen by the buyer. The
payoff for the buyer isM − Bcost(A) −∑a∈A β(a). The payoff for a supplier not inA is 0. The payoff for a supplier a inA
is β(a)− τ(a).
Since we are applying the solution concept of the core, one may think of the game play as follows. All the players in the
game sit down around a negotiating table. All the players talk amongst themselves until they reach an agreement which
cannot be unilaterally and selfishly improved upon by any subset of the players. Once such an agreement is reached, game
play is concluded. Since no subset of the players can unilaterally and selfishly improve upon the agreement, rationality binds
the players to follow the agreement.
The fully formal definition of a buyer–supplier game is given in Section 2.1. The transformation process described above
can be used to create buyer–supplier games from most combinatorial minimization problems. For example, minimum
spanning tree, Steiner tree, shortest path, minimum set cover, minimum cut, single- and multi-commodity flow can all
be used to instantiate a buyer–supplier game.
As a concrete example and interpretation of a buyer–supplier game, consider the buyer–supplierminimum spanning tree
game. In this game, a company owns factories on every node of a graph. The company wishes to connect the factories by
purchasing edges in the graph. Each edge is owned by a unique supplier player. Each supplier has an internal cost associated
with the company’s usage of the edge. The company has a maximum amount of money it is willing to spend on purchasing
edges. Depending on the transportation conditions of a particular edge, the companymay have some internal cost associated
with choosing that particular edge. The buyer–supplier game paradigm yields similarly natural gameswhen applied to other
minimization problems.
In this paper wewill be concernedwith efficient computation over the set of core vectors. For the rest of the paper, when
we say polynomial time, we mean time polynomial in the size of the parameter C, which is also polynomial in the number
of players of the buyer–supplier game.
1.4. Organization of the paper
In Section 2 we define buyer–supplier games and the core of a game. In Section 3 we characterize the core of buyer–
supplier games. In Section 4 we give positive computational results, namely the generic algorithm for optimizing over the
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set of core vectors. In Section 5 we give negative computational results by showing polynomial time equivalence between
several related problems. In Section 6 we give the problem-specific combinatorial algorithm for the buyer–supplier game
arising from the minimum spanning tree problem.
2. Definitions
In this section,we formally define buyer–supplier games and give the game theoretic definitions required for our analysis.
2.1. Buyer–supplier games
Let C be a finite set and M be a non-negative real number. Let τ be a function from C to ℜ+. Let Bcost be a function
from 2C to ℜ+ such that Bcost(∅) = M . The simplifying condition that Bcost(∅) = M is not required. We explain the
condition’s purpose later in this section. For A ⊆ C, let Eval(τ , Bcost,A) denote Bcost(A) + ∑a∈A τ(a). For A ⊆ C,
let MinEval(τ , Bcost,A) denote minB⊆A Eval(τ , Bcost,B). We will omit the parameters τ and Bcost from the functions
Eval(τ , Bcost,A) and MinEval(τ , Bcost,A)when the value is clear.
Given a tuple (C, τ , Bcost), we proceed to define a buyer–supplier game. Associate a player with each element of C. Call
the players inC suppliers. Let there also be another player,µ, whomwe call the buyer. LetP = C∪{µ} be the set of players
for the buyer–supplier game.
The strategy for supplier a is a tuple (β(a), pa) with β(a) ∈ ℜ+ and pa : P → ℜ+. The first element, β(a), represents
supplier a’s bid to the buyer, requiring the buyer to pay β(a) for using the supplier’s services. The second element, pa,
represents the non-negative side payments supplier a chooses to make to the game’s players. By pa(b) we denote the side
payment amakes to player b.
The strategy for the buyer, µ, is a tuple (A, pµ) where A ⊆ C and pµ : P → ℜ+. The first element, A, represents the
suppliers chosen by the buyer for a purchase. Similarly to a supplier, the second element, pµ, represents the non-negative
side payments the buyer chooses to make to the game’s players.
For each player a ∈ P wedenote the player’s strategy set by Sa. For a set of playersA ⊆ P , we denote the set of strategies
a∈A Sa by SA. We call elements of SA strategy vectors. We index strategy vectors from SA by the elements ofA.
We nowdefine the utility function for each player. Suppose strategy s ∈ SP is played. Specifically, suppose that (A, pµ) ∈
Sµ and (β(a), pa) ∈ Sa for each a ∈ C are played. The utility function for buyer is uµ(s) = M − [Bcost(A)+∑a∈A β(a)] +[∑b∈P pb(µ) −∑b∈P pµ(b)]. The utility for a supplier a in A is ua(s) = β(a) − τ(a) + [∑b∈P pb(a) −∑b∈P pa(b)]. The
utility for a supplier a not inA is ua(s) = [∑b∈P pb(a)−∑b∈P pa(b)].
Interpreting, the buyer begins with a total of M utility and chooses to make a purchase from each supplier in A. The
buyer gives β(a) to each supplier a ∈ A and loses an extra Bcost(A) from the initialM utility. Each supplier a inA receives
the bid payment from the buyer and loses τ(a) because the supplier must perform services for the buyer. The distribution
of sidepayments completes the utility functions. The requirement that Bcost(∅) = M lets the strategy ∅ stand as a ‘‘don’t
play’’ strategy for the buyer. To remove the requirement, we could introduce a specific ‘‘don’t play’’ strategy to the buyer’s
strategy set, however this creates a special case in most of our proofs.
Let the sidepayment game we have defined be denoted SP. Let NOSP denote the same game with the additional
requirement that all sidepayments be fixed to zero. In other words, in NOSP we restrict the strategy set for each a ∈ P
so that pa is identically zero.
2.2. Game theoretic definitions
All of the definitions in this section closely follow those of Shubik [23, Chapter 6].
We call a vector inℜ|P |, indexed by a ∈ P , a payoff vector. We say a payoff vector π is realized by a strategy vector s ∈ SP
if πa = ua(s) for all a ∈ P .
Let π be a payoff vector and s be a strategy vector in SA for A ⊆ P . Let t be any strategy vector in SP such that the
restriction of t to the coordinates inA is equal to s. If for all t and for all a ∈ Awe have πa ≤ ua(t), we say that the players
inA can guarantee themselves payoffs of at least π by playing s.
We use Shubik’s alpha theory to define our characteristic sets [23, pp. 134-136]. Thus for a set of players A ⊆ P , we
define the characteristic set, V (A), to be the set of all payoff vectors π such that there is a strategy vector s ∈ SA, possibly
dependent on π , with which the players in A can guarantee themselves payoffs of at least π . In the transferable utility
setting, SP, the characteristic sets can be replacedwith a characteristic function. Given the definitions of the utility functions
in Section 2.1, the characteristic function V˜ (A) for a set of playersA is equal toM −MinEval(τ , Bcost,A− {µ}).
We say that a setA ⊆ P of players are substitutes if V˜ (P )− V˜ (P −B) ≥∑a∈B V˜ (P )− V˜ (P − {a}) for allB ⊆ A.
We say that a payoff vector π dominates a payoff vector ν through a setA ⊆ P if πa > νa for all a ∈ A. In other words,
π dominates ν throughAwhen each player inA does better in π than in ν.
For a set of playersA ⊆ P , we define D(A) as the set of all payoff vectors which are dominated throughA by a payoff
vector in V (A). Interpreting, the players in A would never settle for a payoff vector π ∈ D(A) since they can guarantee
themselves higher payoffs than those offered in π .
The core of a game consists of all π ∈ V (P ) such that π /∈ D(A) for allA ⊆ P .
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3. A characterization of the core
The characterization of the core of buyer–supplier games in the transferable utility setting was done by Shapley and
Shubik [22]. In this section, we show the surprising result that the same characterization holds in the non-transferable
utility setting. In general, it is not the case that the core of the transferable utility and non-transferable utility versions of a
game are the same. For example, the buyer may be able to use bribes to alter the bidding strategies of some suppliers, and
thus reduce the bids of other suppliers. The following condition characterizes the core of buyer–supplier games. A payoff
vector π is in the core of a buyer–supplier game defined by (C, τ , Bcost) if and only if it satisfies
πa ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ P ,−
a∈A
πa ≤ MinEval(τ , Bcost,C −A)−MinEval(τ , Bcost,C) ∀A ⊆ C,
πµ = M −MinEval(τ , Bcost,C)−
−
a∈C
πa.
Asmany of the proofs required to show the result are straightforward, to simplify the presentationwepresent statements
of key lemmas and a few selected proofs. Themain idea that gives the result, captured in Lemma 1, is that sidepayments can
be simulated through altering the bids of the suppliers to the buyer. In Section 3.1, we give some preliminary lemmas for the
games NOSP and SP. In Section 3.2, we show that the core of SP is the same as the core of NOSP and give a characterization
of the core.
3.1. Preliminary lemmas on the core of NOSP and SP
This section contains some preliminary lemmas that are useful in characterizing the core of NOSP and SP.
For some of our proofs it is convenient to think of SP as a two stage distribution of wealth, where the strategy s ∈ SP
determines the utility transfers. Initially, the buyer has M utility and all suppliers have zero utility. In the first stage, the
buyer gives β(b) to each supplier b ∈ A and loses an extra Bcost(A) from the initial M utility. Also in the first stage, each
supplier b ∈ A loses τ(b) of utility. In the second stage, side payments are distributed.
Lemma 1. Let s ∈ SA∪µ be such that sµ = (A, pµ). If s guarantees the players in A ∪ µ payoffs of at least π ∈ ℜ|A∪µ|, then
there is a t ∈ SA∪µ such that
• All side payments from players inA ∪ µ to players inA ∪ µ are fixed to zero in t
• tµ = (A, 0)
• t also guarantees payoffs of at least π .
Proof. We show how to sequentially remove the specified side payments while maintaining the payoff guarantee.
Let a and b be suppliers inA. Let sa = (β(a), pa) and sb = (β(b), pb).
First, consider a supplier to supplier payment. Suppose that pa(b) = λ, that is, supplier a pays λ to supplier b. Because
both a and b are inA, we can achieve the same utility transfer as the side payment by setting the side payment to zero and
changing β(a) to β(a)− λ and β(b) to β(b)+ λ. Thus, we can zero out the side payment from a to b.
Now, consider a supplier to buyer payment. Suppose that pa(µ) = λ. In other words supplier a pays λ to the buyer. We
can achieve the same utility transfer as the side payment by setting the side payment to zero and changing β(a) to β(a)−λ.
Thus, we can zero out the side payment from a to µ.
A similar change works for a payment from the buyer to a supplier. 
Lemma 2. Let strategy vector s ∈ SP realize payoff vector π . If sµ = (A, pµ) and there exists a ∈ C−A such that πa > 0, then
π ∈ D(A ∪ µ) in both SP and NOSP.
Lemma 3. If π is in the core of SP or NOSP, then πa ≥ 0 for all a ∈ P .
Lemma 4. Let π be a payoff vector, and let s be a strategy vector in SP . If the players in P can guarantee themselves payoffs of
at least π by playing s, but s does not realize π , then π is not in the core of either SP or NOSP.
3.2. Core equivalence and characterization
In this section, we prove that the core of NOSP is the same as the core of SP and give a characterization of the core. All
the lemmas in this section are used solely to prove the main result of the section, Theorems 9 and 10.
Lemma 5. Let π be a payoff vector. If π ∈ D(A) in NOSP, then π ∈ D(A) in SP.
Proof. The players inA can follow exactly the same strategy in SP as they would in NOSP. 
Lemma 6. Let π be a payoff vector. If π ∈ V (P ) in SP and π is in the core of SP, then π ∈ V (P ) in NOSP.
Proof. By Lemma 4, π is realized by some strategy vector s ∈ SP in SP. The result follows by Lemma 1. 
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Lemma 7. Let π be a payoff vector. If π ∈ V (P ) in NOSP, then π ∈ V (P ) in SP.
Proof. By the definition of V (P ), the players in P can guarantee themselves payoffs of at least π by playing some strategy
s ∈ SP in NOSP. The players in P can follow exactly the same strategy in SP. 
Lemma 8. If payoff vector π is in the core of NOSP, then for allA ⊆ P we have π /∈ D(A) in SP.
Proof. We use a proof by contradiction. Suppose that π ∈ D(A) in SP for some A ⊆ P . Thus, there is a strategy vector
s ∈ SA in SP which guarantees each player inA a greater payoff than the payoff given in π .
Since π is in the core of NOSP, by Lemma 3 we know πa ≥ 0 for all a ∈ A.
We split the proof into two cases. In the first case, suppose thatµ /∈ A. It is impossible for s to guarantee a payoff greater
than 0 for any player inA since the buyer can always play∅. Thus, we get a contradictionwith the assumption thatπ ∈ D(A)
in SP.
For the second case, suppose µ ∈ A. Let sµ = (B, pµ). There can not be some supplier in B but not in A since that
supplier can always play the strategy (λ, 0) where λ > M to give the buyer a negative payoff. Since πµ ≥ 0, the existence
of a supplier inB −A contradicts the assumption that π ∈ D(A) in SP.
Thus,B ⊆ A− {µ}.
If there is some supplier a in A but not in B, since πa ≥ 0, we know that s must guarantee a payoff greater than 0 for
a. Let ν be the payoff vector realized when the players in A follow s and each of the players in P − A follow the strategy
(0, 0). Thus, νa > 0 and νb > πb for all b ∈ A. By Lemma 2, we have ν ∈ D(B ∪ µ) in SP. Since ν ∈ D(B ∪ µ) in SP, νb > πb
for all b ∈ A, andB ⊆ A− {µ}, we have π ∈ D(B ∪ µ) in SP.
Thus, sµ = (B, pµ) and π ∈ D(B ∪ µ) in SP. By Lemma 1, we also have π ∈ D(B ∪ µ) in NOSP, which contradicts the
fact that π is in the core of NOSP. 
Theorem 9. The core of NOSP is equal to the core of SP.
Proof. By Lemma 6 and the contrapositive of Lemma 5, if payoff vector π is in the core of SP, then π is in the core of NOSP.
By Lemmas 7 and 8, if payoff vector π is in the core of NOSP, then π is in the core of SP. 
The following characterization of the core of SP follows from the work of Shapley and Shubik [22]. By the preceding
theorem, the same characterization is true of NOSP. In the statement of the characterization theorem, the parameter τ is
made explicit, though its value is clear from the definition of the buyer–supplier game.
Theorem 10. A payoff vector π is in the core of SP (or NOSP) if and only if it satisfies
πa ≥ 0 for all a ∈ P (1)−
a∈A
πa ≤ MinEval(τ ,C −A)−MinEval(τ ,C) for allA ⊆ C (2)
πµ = M −MinEval(τ ,C)−
−
a∈C
πa. (3)
Lemma 11. Let Bcost∗(A) = ∑a∈A τ(a) + Bcost(A). The core of the buyer–supplier games defined by (C, τ , Bcost) and
(C, 0, Bcost∗) is the same.
Proof. We have Eval(τ , Bcost,B) = Eval(0, Bcost∗,B) for all B ⊆ C by the definition of Eval and Bcost∗. Thus, we have
MinEval(τ , Bcost,A)=MinEval(0, Bcost∗,A) for allA ⊆ C. The result follows from Theorem 10. 
4. Polynomial time optimization over the core vectors
We define the separation problem on a set of linear inequalities A as follows. Given a vector π , if π satisfies all of the
inequalities in A, then do nothing; otherwise, output a violated inequality a ∈ A. It is well known that the separation
problem is polynomial time equivalent to linear function optimization over the same set of inequalities [14, p. 161].
Let (C, τ , Bcost) define a buyer–supplier game. In this section, to simplify the notation, wewill omit the parameter Bcost
from Eval and MinEval since it is fixed by the buyer–supplier game.
In this section, wewill analyze an algorithm to solve the separation problem for the exponentially sized set of inequalities
given in Eqs. (1)–(3).We now give the algorithm, whichwe call the separation algorithm. Given the payoff vectorπ as input,
1. Iterate over Eqs. (1) and (3) to check that they hold. If some equation does not hold, output that equation and halt.
2. Compute F ⊆ C such that Eval(τ ,F ) = MinEval(τ ,C). If there is some a ∈ C − F with πa > 0, output the inequality
from Eq. (2) corresponding to {a} and halt.
3. Define τˆ (a) = τ(a) + πa for a ∈ C. Now, compute Fˆ ⊆ C such that Eval(τˆ , Fˆ ) = MinEval(τˆ ,C). If Eval(τˆ , Fˆ ) <
Eval(τˆ ,F ), output the inequality from Eq. (2) corresponding to F − Fˆ . Otherwise, halt.
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Theorem 12. If given an input τˆ : C → ℜ+ it is possible to compute both Eval(τˆ ,A), for any A ⊆ C, and F ⊆ C such that
Eval(τˆ ,F ) = MinEval(τˆ ,C) in polynomial time, then the separation problem for Eqs. (1)–(3) is solvable in polynomial time.
Furthermore, optimizing any linear function of π over Eqs. (1)–(3) is also possible in polynomial time.
Proof. It is clear that, given the theorem’s assumptions, the separation algorithm runs in polynomial time. The statement
follows from Lemmas 13 and 14. The final claim of the theorem follows from the equivalence of separation and
optimization. 
Lemma 13. If the separation algorithm returns an inequality on input π , then π violates the returned inequality.
Proof. If the algorithm returns an inequality in step 1, then the inequality is violated since the algorithm performed a direct
check.
If the algorithm returns an inequality in step 2, then the inequality is violated since πa > 0, but MinEval(τ ,C − {a}) =
MinEval(τ ,C) = Eval(τ ,F ).
Suppose the algorithm returns an inequality in step 3. Thus, Eval(τˆ , Fˆ ) < Eval(τˆ ,F ). Applying the definitions of Eval
and τˆ ,
∑
a∈Fˆ πa + Eval(τ , Fˆ ) <
∑
a∈F πa + Eval(τ ,F ).
Since the algorithm reaches step 3, we know that πa = 0 for all a ∈ C − F . Thus, we have∑a∈Fˆ ∩F πa + Eval(τ , Fˆ ) <∑
a∈F πa + Eval(τ ,F ), which in turn gives Eval(τ , Fˆ )− Eval(τ ,F ) <
∑
a∈F−Fˆ πa.
LetA = F −Fˆ . From the algorithm,we know that the setF satisfies Eval(τ ,F ) = MinEval(τ ,C). Since Fˆ ⊆ C−A, the
definition of MinEval implies that MinEval(τ ,C −A) ≤ Eval(τ , Fˆ ). Thus, we have MinEval(τ ,C −A)−MinEval(τ ,C) ≤
Eval(τ , Fˆ )− Eval(τ ,F ) <∑a∈A πa, which shows that the inequality output by the algorithm is violated. 
Lemma 14. If π violates some inequality in Eqs. (1)–(3), then the separation algorithm run on input π returns an inequality.
Proof. If the violation is in Eqs. (1) or (3), the violated inequalitywill be output by thedirect check in step 1. If some inequality
is output by step 2, we are done. Otherwise, since steps 1 and 2 output no inequality, we know thatπa = 0 for all a ∈ C−F ,
where F is as computed in the algorithm.
Now, suppose the inequality from Eq. (2) for set A ⊆ C is violated. In other words,∑a∈A πa > MinEval(τ ,C −A) −
MinEval(τ ,C). LetB be such that Eval(τ ,B) = MinEval(τ ,C −A).
Thus,
∑
a∈A πa > MinEval(τ ,C −A)−MinEval(τ ,C) = Eval(τ ,B)− Eval(τ ,F ).
Since πa = 0 for all a ∈ C − F , we have Eval(τ ,F )+∑a∈F ∩A πa > Eval(τ ,B).
Adding
∑
a∈F−A πa to both sides of the above inequality and substituting the definition of Eval, we have Bcost(F ) +∑
a∈F τ(a)+
∑
a∈F πa > Bcost(B)+
∑
a∈B τ(a)+
∑
a∈F−A πa.
Since πa = 0 for all a ∈ C − F and B ⊆ C − A, we can alter the right hand side of the above inequality to get
Bcost(F )+∑a∈F τ(a)+∑a∈F πa > Bcost(B)+∑a∈B τ(a)+∑a∈B πa +∑a∈F−A−B πa.
By applying the definition of τˆ and Eval, we have Eval(τˆ ,F ) > Eval(τˆ ,B) +∑a∈F−A−B πa. We know that πa ≥ 0
for all a ∈ P since the algorithm does not output anything in step 1. Thus, Eval(τˆ ,F ) > Eval(τˆ ,B) ≥ MinEval(τˆ ,C) =
Eval(τˆ , Fˆ ), where Fˆ is as computed in the algorithm. So, step 3 outputs an inequality. 
The following lemma illustrates a key difference between Garg et al. and this work.
Lemma 15. If suppliers are substitutes, then all but the |C| singleton equations of Eq. (2) are not constraining. Thus, if suppliers
are substitutes, optimization over the core of the buyer–supplier game is reduced to solving a polynomially sized linear program.
Proof. Suppose that the suppliers are substitutes. By the definition of ‘‘suppliers are substitutes’’, V˜ (P ) − V˜ (P −A) ≥∑
a∈A[V˜ (P )− V˜ (P − {a})] for allA ⊆ C. By the definition of V˜ ,
MinEval(τ , Bcost,C −A)−MinEval(τ , Bcost,C)
≥
−
a∈A
[MinEval(τ , Bcost,C − {a})−MinEval(τ , Bcost,C)]
for allA ⊆ C. This implies that, if the singleton equations in Eq. (2) are satisfied, then so are all equations in Eq. (2). Thus, if
suppliers are substitutes, we may drop all non-singleton equations from Eq. (2) and reduce the number of inequalities to a
polynomial in the number of players. 
5. Inapproximability of optimization over core solutions
Consider a buyer–supplier game defined by (C, τ , Bcost). We introduced the concept of the focus point price in the
introduction. The concept leads us to ask the natural question: What is the difference between the best and worst core
outcome for the buyer? In otherwords, the value of interest is the solution to the linear program:maximize
∑
a∈C πa subject
to Eqs. (1)–(3). This natural question leads us to define the focus point price (FPP) problem as follows: on input (C, τ , Bcost),
output the optimal value of the afore mentioned linear program.
Define the Necessary Element (NEL) problem as follows. Given parameters (C, τ , Bcost) return TRUE if there exist an
element a ∈ C such that for all F ⊆ C satisfying Eval(τ , Bcost,F ) = MinEval(τ , Bcost,C) we have a ∈ F . Otherwise,
return FALSE.
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Define the OPT-SET problem as follows. Given parameters (C, τ , Bcost), return F such that Eval(τ , Bcost,F ) =
MinEval(τ , Bcost,C).
In this section, we will show that the FPP problem, the OPT-SET problem and the NEL problem are polynomial time
equivalent. In Section 5.1, we show how to solve the OPT-SET problem in polynomial time if the NEL problem is solvable in
polynomial time. In Section 5.2, we show the polynomial time equivalence of NEL, OPT-SET, and separation over Eqs. (1)–(3).
5.1. Polynomial time reduction from OPT-SET to NEL
In this section, we show that given a polynomial time algorithm to solve the NEL problem, we can solve the OPT-SET
problem in polynomial time. All of the lemmas in this section are used solely to prove the section’s main result, Lemma 20.
For a fixed tuple (C, τ , Bcost)we say we extend the tuple to contain a shadow element for an element a ⊆ C by creating
the extended tuple (Cˆ, τˆ , Bcost∗), where Cˆ = C ∪ b with b /∈ C; τˆ is the same as τ with the addition that τˆ (b) = τ(a);
and forA ⊆ Cˆ, if b /∈ A, then Bcost∗(A) = Bcost(A), otherwise Bcost∗(A) = Bcost((A− {b}) ∪ {a}). We call b the shadow
element corresponding to a.
The full shadow extension of (C, τ , Bcost) is the tuple (Cˆ, τˆ , Bcost∗) resulting from extending (C, τ , Bcost) to contain a
shadow element for each element in C.
First, we reduce OPT-SET to NEL. To show the result, we analyze the following algorithm, which we call the shadow
algorithm.
On input (C, τ , Bcost),
1. Let (Cˆ∗, τˆ , Bcost∗) be the full shadow extension of (C, τ , Bcost). Let the program variable Cˆ equal Cˆ∗.
2. For each a ∈ C
• Remove a’s corresponding shadow element from Cˆ.
• Run NEL on (Cˆ, τˆ , Bcost∗).
• If the return value is TRUE, then add the shadow element back to Cˆ.
• If the return value is FALSE, then remove a from Cˆ.
3. Return Cˆ ∩ C. In other words, we return all elements from C remaining in Cˆ, disregarding any shadow elements.
Lemma 16. Let (C, τ , Bcost) be the input to the shadow algorithm. Let the triple (Cˆ∗, τˆ , Bcost∗) be the full shadow extension
of (C, τ , Bcost). If for all A ⊆ Cˆ∗ the NEL problem on input (A, τˆ , Bcost∗) is solvable in polynomial time, then the shadow
algorithm runs in polynomial time.
Proof. Creating Cˆ∗ takes polynomial time since there are O(|C|) elements. Defining τˆ takes polynomial time since there
are O(|C|) inputs. Queries to Bcost∗ can be implemented with polynomial overhead on top of queries to Bcost. Thus, the
initialization step of the algorithm takes polynomial time.
Consider a single loop iteration. The first, third and fourth lines of the loop each take O(|C|) time. The second step takes
polynomial time by the lemma assumption. Thus, a single loop iteration takes polynomial time.
There are |C| loop iterations and computing the intersection in the algorithm’s final step takes O(|C|) time. Thus the
algorithm runs in polynomial time. 
Lemma 17. The shadow algorithm maintains the invariant
MinEval(τ , Bcost,C) = MinEval(τˆ , Bcost∗, Cˆ).
Proof. Initially, MinEval(τ , Bcost,C) = MinEval(τˆ , Bcost∗, Cˆ) by the definitions of Cˆ, τˆ , and Bcost∗.
Consider the loop iteration for a ∈ C. Let the corresponding shadow element be b. When we remove or add b to Cˆ, we
have MinEval(τ , Bcost,C) = MinEval(τˆ , Bcost∗, Cˆ) by the definitions of τˆ , and Bcost∗ and the fact that a is still in Cˆ.
We only remove both a and b if NEL returned FALSE before the removal of a. Let Cˆa and Cˆ ′a be the value of the
variable Cˆ before and after the removal of a, respectively. Since NEL returned FALSE on (Cˆa, τˆ , Bcost∗), there exists some
F ⊆ Cˆa such that a /∈ F and Eval(τˆ , Bcost∗,F ) = MinEval(τˆ , Bcost∗, Cˆa). Thus, F ⊆ Cˆ ′a and MinEval(τˆ , Bcost∗, Cˆa) =
MinEval(τˆ , Bcost∗, Cˆ ′a).
Thus, throughout the algorithm the value of MinEval(τˆ , Bcost∗, Cˆ) does not change, which concludes the proof. 
Lemma 18. Let Cˆa be the value of the variable Cˆ at the end of iteration corresponding to a ∈ C. If a ∈ Cˆa, then a is in all OPT-SET
solutions on input (A, τˆ , Bcost∗) whereA = Cˆa ∩ C.
Proof. Let the arguments of the NEL problem which is solved during the iteration corresponding to a be (B, τˆ , Bcost∗).
Since a ∈ Cˆa, NEL returns TRUE during the iteration corresponding to a.
Suppose there is a solution F ⊆ C to OPT-SET on input (A, τˆ , Bcost∗) which does not contain a. Consider F and Fˆ
where Fˆ contains all the shadow elements of the elements of F . The sets F and Fˆ are disjoint and both subsets of B.
Also, by the definition of F , τˆ and Bcost∗, Eval(τˆ , Bcost∗,F ) = Eval(τˆ , Bcost∗, Fˆ ) = MinEval(τˆ , Bcost∗,B). Thus, the NEL
problem run during the iteration corresponding to a should return FALSE, which is a contradiction. 
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Lemma 19. Let Cˆa be the value of the variable Cˆ at the end of iteration corresponding to a ∈ C. We haveMinEval(τ , Bcost,C) =
MinEval(τ , Bcost, Cˆa ∩ C).
Proof. Let F be such that Eval(τˆ , Bcost∗,F ) = MinEval(τˆ , Bcost∗, Cˆa). If Eval(τˆ , Bcost∗,F ) = M , then let Fˆ = ∅; other-
wise, let Fˆ beF with each shadow element replaced by the corresponding element in C. By the definitions of τˆ and Bcost∗,
we have Eval(τˆ , Bcost∗,F ) = Eval(τˆ , Bcost∗, Fˆ ). But, by the construction of Fˆ , we have Fˆ ⊆ Cˆa ∩ C.
Thus,
MinEval(τˆ , Bcost∗, Cˆa) = Eval(τˆ , Bcost∗,F )
= Eval(τˆ , Bcost∗, Fˆ ) ≥ MinEval(τˆ , Bcost∗, Cˆa ∩ C).
Also, by the definition of MinEval, we have that MinEval(τˆ , Bcost∗, Cˆa) is at most MinEval(τˆ , Bcost∗, Cˆa ∩ C). So,
MinEval(τˆ , Bcost∗, Cˆa) = MinEval(τˆ , Bcost∗, Cˆa ∩ C).
Combining Lemma 17 with the result from the last paragraph,
MinEval(τ , Bcost,C) = MinEval(τˆ , Bcost∗, Cˆa) = MinEval(τˆ , Bcost∗, Cˆa ∩ C).
And, by the definition of τˆ and Bcost∗, we have MinEval(τˆ , Bcost∗, Cˆa ∩ C) equals MinEval(τ , Bcost, Cˆa ∩ C). 
Lemma 20. Let (C, τ , Bcost) be the input to the shadow algorithm. Let the triple (Cˆ∗, τˆ , Bcost∗) be the full shadow extension
of (C, τ , Bcost). If for all A ⊆ Cˆ∗ the NEL problem on input (A, τˆ , Bcost∗) is solvable in polynomial time, then the OPT-SET
problem on input (C, τ , Bcost) is solvable in polynomial time.
Proof. By Lemma 16, the shadow algorithm runs in polynomial time.
Let Cˆ ′ be the value of the variable Cˆ at the end of the algorithm. By Lemma 19, Cˆ ′ ∩ C is a superset of a solution to the
OPT-SET problem. By Lemma 18, Cˆ ′ ∩ C is a subset of a solution to the OPT-SET problem. Thus, the value returned by the
shadow algorithm, Cˆ ′ ∩ C, is a solution to the OPT-SET problem. 
5.2. Polynomial time equivalence of NEL, OPT-SET, and separation
In this section we show a polynomial time equivalence between the NEL problem, the OPT-SET problem and the
separation problem over Eqs. (1)–(3). The lemmas in this section are used to show the section’s main result, Theorem 23. As
a byproduct of the proofs, we also show an hardness of approximation result for the FPP problem with Lemma 24.
Lemma 21. The solution to the FPP problem on input (C, τ , Bcost) is 0 if and only if the solution to the NEL problem on input
(C, τ , Bcost) is FALSE.
Proof. First, we prove that if the solution to the NEL problem is FALSE, then the solution to the FPP problem is zero. Consider
all of the inequality pairs πa ≤ MinEval(τ , Bcost,C − {a}) − MinEval(τ , Bcost,C) and πa ≥ 0. Since the solution to the
NEL problem is FALSE, for each a ∈ C there is a Fa ⊆ C such that Eval(Fa, Bcost,C) = MinEval(τ , Bcost,C) and a /∈ Fa.
Thus the first inequality in the pair reduces to πa ≤ 0, and the pair of inequalities imply πa = 0. This is true for all a ∈ C.
Thus, the optimal value of the FPP linear program is zero.
Second, we prove that if the solution to the NEL problem is TRUE, then the solution to the FPP problem is greater than
zero. If the solution to NEL is TRUE, then there is some a ∈ C such that if Eval(τ , Bcost,F ) = MinEval(τ , Bcost,C) then
a ∈ F . In other words, a is in all solutions to the OPT-SET problem on input (C, τ , Bcost).
Thus, for allA ⊆ C with a ∈ A,
MinEval(τ , Bcost,C −A)−MinEval(τ , Bcost,C) > 0.
Let λ = minA⊆C
a∈A
[MinEval(τ , Bcost,C −A)−MinEval(τ , Bcost,C)]. Consider the vector π with πb = 0 for all b ∈ C − {a}
and πa = λ and πµ = M − MinEval(τ , Bcost,C) − λ. Since λ ≤ M − MinEval(τ , Bcost,C), this vector is feasible in the
focus point price linear program and achieves an objective function value greater than zero. 
Lemma 22. If it is possible to approximate the solution to the FPP problem on input (C, τ , Bcost)within anymultiplicative factor,
then the NEL problem on input (C, τ , Bcost) is solvable in polynomial time.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 21. 
A set of (C, τ , Bcost) instances is proper if the following conditions hold:
• Given that (C, τ , Bcost) is in the set, then so is (C, τˆ , Bcost), where τˆ (a) = τ(a)+ πa for a vector π ∈ ℜ|C|+ .
• Given that (C, τ , Bcost) is in the set, then so is (A, τˆ , Bcost∗), where the triple (Cˆ, τˆ , Bcost∗) is the full shadow extension
of (C, τ , Bcost) andA is a subset of Cˆ.
The definition of proper has a natural interpretation when applied to the transformations of combinatorial minimization
problems to buyer–supplier games. For example, for the shortest path problem, the first condition implies that the set of
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instances is closed with respect to lengthening the edges of the graph. On the other hand, the second condition implies that
the set of instances is closed with respect to adding parallel edges or removing a subset of the edges.
Theorem 23. On a proper set of instances, the separation problem over Eqs. (1)–(3), the NEL problem and the OPT-SET problem
are polynomial time equivalent.
Proof. If we can solve the NEL problem on a proper set of instances in polynomial time, then, by Lemma 20, we can solve
the OPT-SET problem in polynomial time.
If we can solve the OPT-SET problem on a proper set of instances in polynomial time, then, by Theorem 12, we can solve
the separation problem over Eqs. (1)–(3) in polynomial time.
If we can solve the separation problem over Eqs. (1)–(3) on a proper set of instances in polynomial time, then, by the
polynomial time equivalence of separation and optimization, we can optimize linear objective functions over Eqs. (1)–(3)
in polynomial time. If we can optimize linear objective functions in polynomial time, by Lemma 22 we can solve the NEL
problem in polynomial time. 
Lemma 24. On a proper set of instances, if it is not possible to solve the OPT-SET problem in polynomial time, it is not possible to
approximate the solution to the FPP problem to within any multiplicative factor in polynomial time.
Proof. Follows from Theorem 23 and Lemma 22. 
6. A complementary combinatorial algorithm
In this section, we present an efficient combinatorial algorithm for solving the FPP problem for the buyer–supplier
minimum spanning tree (MST) game. Beforewe go on to give the combinatorial algorithm,we present a useful simplification
of the linear program representing the FPP problem for general buyer–supplier games that may be of independent interest.
For the simplification, fix a buyer–supplier game defined by (C, τ , Bcost). Let the buyer–supplier game be derived from
the combinatorial minimization problem MinProb as described in Section 1. We omit the parameters τ and Bcost from
MinEval since they are fixed by the game.
Call the linear program the linear program from the FPP problem LP1 and let its optimal value be O1. Consider the
following linear program
max
−
b∈C
πb
s.t.
−
b∈A
πb ≤ MinProb(C −A)−MinProb(C) for allA ⊆ C
πb ≥ 0 for all b ∈ C.
Call the above linear program LP2 and let its optimal value be O2. Using the definitions of MinProb, MinEval, and simple
manipulations of the linear programs, it is straight forward to show the following three lemmas.
Lemma 25. IfMinProb(C) ≥ M, then O1 = 0.
Lemma 26. IfMinProb(C) < M and O2 ≤ M −MinProb(C), then O1 = O2.
Lemma 27. IfMinProb(C) < M and O2 > M −MinProb(C), then O1 = M −MinProb(C).
By the three preceding lemmas, finding the value of MinProb(C) and the solution to LP2 is sufficient to solve the FPP
problem for a given buyer–supplier game.
We continue with the combinatorial algorithm. Let a graph G = (V, E) and edge weights w : E → ℜ+ be given. Let
MSTVal : 2E → ℜ+ be a function that takes as input a set of the edges A ⊆ E and returns the weight of the minimum
spanning tree of the graph induced by the edges ofA. If no spanning tree exists, MSTVal returns∞.
By the transformation in Section 1 and Lemma 11 in the buyer–supplier minimum spanning tree game, C = E ,
τ(a) = w(a), and Bcost(A) = M if A does not connect all nodes in V , or 0 otherwise. We omit the parameters τ and
Bcost from MinEval, since they are fixed by the game.
We begin with some basic results on MSTs, introduced here without proof, as they can be found in or derived from
principles found in many graduate texts such as Cormen et al. [5].
Lemma 28. Let H = (V1, E1) be any graph. Let T = (V1, E ′1) be a minimum spanning tree of the graph H. For e ∈ E ′1 let the cut
created in T by the removal of e be (Ae,Be) for someAe ⊆ V1 andBe ⊆ V1.
• The edge e is a minimum weight edge spanning the cut (Ae,Be).
• The tree T restricted to vertices in Ae is a minimum spanning tree of the graph induced by the vertices Ae. A symmetric
statement is true forBe.
• LetU be the set of edges spanning the cut and let a = argminb∈U−{e}w(b). We have w(a) − w(e) = MSTVal(E1 − {e}) −
MSTVal(E1).
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The following lemma is due to Bikhchandani et al., who show that in the MST buyer–supplier game, the suppliers are
substitutes [2].
Lemma 29. Suppose the graph G is connected and thus MSTVal(E) is finite. For all A ⊆ E , MSTVal(E −A) − MSTVal(E) ≥∑
e∈A[MSTVal(E − {e})−MSTVal(E)].
Let LP2 be as defined above with MinProb equal to MSTVal.
Lemma 30. The inequalities corresponding to singleton sets {e} for e ∈ E form an optimal basis for LP2. In particular, setting
πe = MSTVal(E − {e})−MSTVal(E) for all e ∈ E gives an optimal vector for LP2.
Proof. ForA ⊆ E , by Lemma 29, we have−
e∈A
πe =
−
e∈A
[MSTVal(E − {e})−MSTVal(E)]
≤ MSTVal(E −A)−MSTVal(E).
Thus, π is feasible in LP2. Each inequality of type πe ≤ MSTVal(E − {e}) − MSTVal(E) is tight, thus it is not possible to
increase any coordinate of π . Thus π is an optimal vector and the singleton inequalities form an optimal basis. 
We give a modified Kruskal Algorithm which can be used to compute the optimal value of LP2.
Run Kruskal Algorithm with the following modifications.
• Throughout the algorithm’s execution we will keep an auxiliary set of edges,A, which is initially empty.
• When edge e is added to the minimum spanning forest, also add e to the setA.
• Suppose edge e is rejected from addition to the minimum spanning forest because it creates a cycle. Let the cycle created
be H = (V ′, E ′). For each edge a ∈ E ′ − {e}, if a ∈ A, label awithw(e)− w(a) and remove a fromA.
Lemma 31. Let G be connected and T = (V1, E1) be the minimum spanning tree computed by the modified Kruskal Algorithm
when it is run on G = (V, E). If e ∈ E1 has been labeled, the label is equal to MSTVal(E − {e}) − MSTVal(E). Otherwise,
MSTVal(E − {e})−MSTVal(E) = ∞.
Proof. LetU be the set of edges spanning the cut created in T by the removal of e. Also, let a′ be any argminb∈U−{e}w(b). By
Lemma 28,w(a′)− w(e) = MSTVal(E − {e})−MSTVal(E).
Let e be labeled by the modified Kruskal Algorithm when the edge a creates a cycle. For the first part of the lemma, all
we must show is a = a′.
LetK be the set of edges which create a cycle involving e during the algorithm. If b ∈ E −U, then b does not span the
cut created in T by the removal of e. Thus, both vertices of b lie on the same side of the cut. Thus, b cannot create a cycle
involving e, since all edges in the cycle except bmust be in the tree T . Also, the edge e cannot form a cycle with itself. Thus,
K ⊆ U− {e}.
Consider any b ∈ U − {e}. The edge b must be rejected by the modified Kruskal algorithm, otherwise the edge would
be in T and would not span the cut created in T by the removal of e. Thus, bmust create a cycle during the algorithm. Since
all edges except bwhich make up the cycle must be in T and b spans the cut created by e, the cycle created by b includes e.
Thus,U− {e} ⊆ K , andU− {e} = K .
Since the modified Kruskal Algorithm process edges of G in ascending order of weight and e is labeled by the element
fromK which is processed first, we know a = argminb∈Kw(b). SinceK = U, we also have a = a′ and we have shown the
first part of the lemma.
If e is not labeled, thenK must be empty. SinceK = U, the setUmust also be empty. And thus, the removal of emust
disconnect the graph G. Thus, MSTVal(E − {e})−MSTVal(E) = ∞. 
The modified Kruskal algorithm produces the optimal value to LP2. By our simplification of the FPP linear program, the
MST weight of G and the optimal value of LP2 solve the FPP problem for the buyer–supplier MST game.
Acknowledgments
The second author was supported by NSF Grants CCF–0635203 and ANI–0326001.
References
[1] A. Archer, E. Tardos, Truthfulmechanisms for one-parameter agents, in: Proceedings of the 42nd Annual IEEE Symposiumon Foundations of Computer
Science, Oct. 2001, pp. 482–491.
[2] S. Bikhchandani, S. de Vries, J. Schummer, R. Vohra, Linear programming and vickrey auctions, in:Mathematics of the Internet: E-Auction andMarkets,
Springer-Verlag, New York, NY, 2002, pp. 75–115.
[3] S. Bikhchandani, J. Ostroy, The package assignment model, Journal of Economic Theory 107 (2002) 377–406.
[4] A. Caprara, A.N. Letchford, Computing good allocations for combinatorial optimization games, Lancaster University Management School working
paper. Available from: http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/7082/, 2006.
[5] T.H. Cormen, C.E. Leiserson, R.L. Rivest, C. Stein, Introduction to Algorithms, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2001.
N.B. Dimitrov, C.G. Plaxton / Theoretical Computer Science 412 (2011) 614–625 625
[6] X. Deng, T. Ibaraki, H. Nagamochi, Algorithmic aspects of the core of combinatorial optimization games,Mathematics of Operations Research 24 (1999)
751–766.
[7] X. Deng, C. Papadimitriou, S. Safra, On the complexity of equilibria, in: Proceedings of the 34th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing,
Montreal, Quebec, 2002, pp. 67–71.
[8] F.Y. Edgeworth, Mathematical Psychics, an Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences, A.M. Kelley, New York, NY, 1961.
[9] U. Faigle, W. Kern, On the core of ordered submodular cost games, Mathematical Programming 87 (2000) 483–499.
[10] R. Garg, V. Kumar, A. Rudra, A. Verma, Coalitional games on graphs: Core structure, substitutes and frugality, in: Proceedings of the 4th ACMConference
on Electronic Commerce, San Diego, CA, 2003, pp. 248–249.
[11] D.B. Gillies, Some theorems on n-person games, Ph.D. Thesis, Princeton University, 1953.
[12] M.X. Goemans, M. Skutella, Cooperative facility location games, Journal of Algorithms 50 (2004) 194–214.
[13] A.R. Karlin, D. Kempe, T. Tamir, Beyond VCG: Frugality of truthful mechanisms, in: Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations
of Computer Science, Oct. 2005, pp. 615–624.
[14] G.L. Nemhauser, L.A. Wolsey, Integer and Combinatorial Optimization, John Wiley and Sons, New York, NY, 1988.
[15] M. Pál, E. Tardos, Group strategy proof mechanisms via primal–dual algorithms, in: Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations
of Computer Science, Oct. 2003, pp. 584–593.
[16] C.H. Papadimitriou, Algorithms, games, and the internet, in: Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, July 2001,
pp. 749–753.
[17] C.H. Papadimitriou, T. Roughgarden, Computing equilibria in multi-player games, in: Proceedings of the 16th Annual ACM–SIAM Symposium on
Discrete Algorithms, January 2005, pp. 82–91.
[18] T. Roughgarden, Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2005.
[19] T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, How bad is selfish routing? Journal of ACM 49 (2002) 236–259.
[20] T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games, Games and Economic Behaviour 47 (2004) 389–403.
[21] L.S. Shapley, Notes on the n-person game III: Some variants of the von Neumann-Morgenstern definition of solution, Research memorandum, RAND
Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1952.
[22] L.S. Shapley, M. Shubik, The assignment game i: The core, International Journal of Game Theory 1 (1972) 111–130.
[23] M. Shubik, Game Theory in the Social Sciences, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachussetts, 1984.
[24] J. von Neumann, O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1953.
